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Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT 
Theory of Consciousness 
ROCCOJ.GENNARO 
Indiana State University 
Terre Haute, IN 47809 
USA 
Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, 
or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As 
Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Conscious- 
ness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, 'all consciousness is, by 
its very nature, self-consciousness/1 I share this view with Sartre and 
have elsewhere argued for it at length.2 My overall aim in this paper is 
to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of 
the so-called 'higher-order thought theory of consciousness' (the HOT 
theory) which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious 
mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of (self-) consciousness and 
reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how 
Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspec- 
tive. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called 
'analytic Anglo-American' tradition, but I attempt to show how this 
1 Kathleen Wider, The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philoso- 
phy of Mind (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1997), 1. I will hereafter refer to this 
book as BNC. Wider also provides us with a very good sense of the tradition behind 
the view that consciousness is self-consciousness through an examination of Des- 
cartes, Locke, and Kant, in ch. 1. 
2 Rocco J. Gennaro, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-Order 
Thought Theory of Consciousness (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishers 1996). This 
book will hereafter be abbreviated as CSC. 
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obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contempo- 
rary theory of consciousness. 
In Section I, I explain some key Sartrean terminology and in Section 
II, I introduce the HOT theory. Section III is where I argue for the close 
connection between Sartre's theory and a somewhat modified version of 
the HOT theory. That section of the paper is divided into four subsections 
in which I also address the relevance of Sartre's rejection of the Freudian 
unconscious and the threat of an infinite regress in his theory of con- 
sciousness. In Section IV, I critically examine what I call 'the unity 
problem,' which has mainly been raised by Kathleen Wider against 
Sartre. In light of Section III, I attempt to relieve some of Sartre's difficul- 
ties. In Section V, I critically examine a passage from Being and Nothing- 
ness3 containing one of Sartre's main arguments for his belief that 
consciousness entails self-consciousness. In Section VI, I show how 
Sartre and the HOT theory can accommodate so-called T-thoughts' into 
the structure of conscious mental states with the help of Wider's view. 
Finally, in Section VII, I offer some concluding remarks. 
I Sartre's Terminology and Basic Theory 
Sartre divides reality into what he calls I^eing-in-itself ' and 'being-for- 
itself .' The in-itself (en-soi) refers to nonconscious parts of reality whereas 
the for-itself (pour-soi) refers to consciousness and, more specifically, to 
human self -consciousness. Being-in-itself 'is what it is' (BN 29) whereas 
the for-itself 'is not what it is and is what it is not' (BN 120, 127).4 The 
'being of consciousness does not coincide with itself in a full equivalence' 
(BN 120; cf. BN 153). The for-itself is directed outside itself and is that 
through which negation and nothingness enter the world. Following 
Husserl, Sartre urges that 'all consciousness ... is consciousness of some- 
thing' (BN 11, 23). The key point here is the essentially intentional aspect 
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, Hazel E. Barnes, trans. (New York: Philo- 
sophical Library 1956). All future references to this work will be abbreviated BN in 
the text followed by the page number. The page references will be to the paperback 
edition. The passage I am referring to here is BN 11. 
4 I will return briefly to Sartre's puzzling notion that consciousness violates the Law 
of Identity later, in Section IV. On this topic, however, also see BNC 43-53, 150-4. 
For a good discussion of the for-itself /in-itself distinction, see Joseph Catalano, A 
Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1974), 41-8. 
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of consciousness.5 When I am in a conscious mental state, it is directed 
at or 'about' something else.6 
Sartre distinguishes between positional (or thetic) consciousness and 
non-positional (or non-thetic) consciousness. Cumming tells us that 'an act 
of consciousness is "positional" or "thetic" when it asserts the existence 
of its object.'7 Obviously related to the intentional nature of conscious- 
ness, the idea is that when one's conscious attention is focused on 
something else, one 'posits' the existence of an intentional object. On the 
other hand, one merely has 'non-positional' consciousness of 'anything 
that falls within one's field of awareness but to which one is not now 
paying attention' (BNC 41). Every act of consciousness, Sartre eventually 
argues, has both a positional and non-positional aspect in ways that will 
become clear later. Sartre also distinguishes between pre-reflective (or 
unreflective or non-reflective) consciousness and reflective consciousness. Suf- 
fice it to say for now that the former is basically outer-directed conscious- 
ness and the latter is inner-directed consciousness.8 Pre-reflective 
consciousness is what Sartre and commentators (with Descartes in mind) 
refer to as the 'pre-reflective cogito' whereas Sartre initially defines 
reflection as 'a consciousness which posits a consciousness.'9 
5 For much more on Sartre and intentionality, see Phyllis Sutton Morris, Sartre's 
Concept of a Person: An Analytic Approach (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press 1975). For more background on Sartre and his predecessors (especially 
Husserl), see BNC 41-3; Catalano, Commentary, 4-13; and William Schroeder, Sartre 
and his Predecessors: The Self and the Other (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1984). 
6 It is questionable, however, that all mental states are intentional in this sense. For 
example, pains are not 'about anything/ There are no 'pains that p' or 'pains about 
x/ On the other hand, we might of course agree that pains are still 'representational' 
in some sense of the term, e.g. directed at a part of my body. 
7 Robert Denoon Cumming, The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Random 
House 1965), 51n. 
8 My understanding of the secondary literature is that in her 'Key to Special Termi- 
nology' at the end of BN, Hazel Barnes should not have equated pre-reflective or 
unreflective consciousness with non-thetic or non-positional self-consciousness. 
Nor should she have equated reflective consciousness with thetic or positional 
self-consciousness. 
9 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpa- 
trick, trans. (New York: Hill and Wang 1957), 62. All future references to this book 
will be abbreviated in the text as TE followed by the page number. It should also be 
noted here that Sartre does eventually distinguish between pure and impure 
reflection, which I briefly address later in Section III.4. 1 am primarily concerned 
with pure reflection throughout this paper, but the basic definition of reflection from 
TE is sufficient for my immediate purposes. 
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With the above sketch of Sartrean concepts in place, let us introduce 
the HOT theory before examining Sartre's theory in much greater detail. 
II The HOT Theory 
In the absence of any plausible reductionist account of consciousness in 
nonmentalistic terms, the HOT theory says that the best explanation for 
what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a 
thought (or awareness) that one is in that state.10 The intuitive idea, 
shared by Sartre, is that when one is in a conscious mental state one is 
certainly aware that one is in it. The sense of 'conscious state' I have in 
mind is the same as Nagel's sense, i.e. there is 'something it is like to be 
in that state' from a subjective or first-person point of view.11 When I am, 
for example, having a conscious visual experience, there is something it 
'seems' or 'feels' like from my subjective perspective. But when a con- 
scious mental state is a first-order world-directed state the higher-order 
thought (HOT) is not itself conscious; otherwise, circularity and an 
infinite regress would follow. Moreover, when the HOT is itself con- 
scious, there is a yet higher-order (or third-order) thought directed at the 
second-order state. In this case, we have introspection which involves a 
conscious HOT directed at an inner state. When one introspects, one's 
attention is directed back into one's mind. 
For example, what makes my desire to write a good paper a conscious 
first-order desire is that there is a (nonconscious) HOT directed at the 
desire. In such a case, my conscious focus is directed at the paper. When 
I introspect that desire, however, I then have a conscious HOT directed 
at the desire itself. Figure 1 summarizes the contrast between first-order 
conscious states and introspective states on the standard HOT theory. 
I suggest that self-consciousness is simply having meta-psychological 
or higher-order thoughts, even when the HOT is not itself conscious. A 
higher-order thought is, of course, simply a thought directed at another 
mental state. I have therefore argued at length in CSC that consciousness 
entails self-consciousness, but it is important to note here that there are 
degrees or levels of self-consciousness, with introspection as its more 
complex form. Thus, all introspection involves self-consciousness, but 
10 See David Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Consciousness/ Philosophical Studies 49 
(1986) 329-59. 1 also defend the HOT theory at great length in CSC. 
11 Thomas Nagel, 'What is it Like to be a Bat?' Philosophical Review 83 (1974) 435-50. 
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not necessarily vice versa. Some might still wonder why self-conscious- 
ness need not be consciousness o/some thing. I offer two reasons here:12 
(1) Few (if any) philosophers hold that self-consciousness is literally 
'consciousness of a self/ especially since Hume observed that we are not 
aware of an unchanging or underlying self but only a succession of 
mental states. Thus the 'ordinary meaning' of 'self-consciousness' is 
somewhat open because the term does not wear its meaning on its sleeve. 
We are somewhat free to stipulate a meaning, though not of course in an 
entirely arbitrarily manner. It is clear from The Transcendence of the Ego 
that Sartre shares the view that there is no T or 'self standing behind 
one's sequence of mental states. There 'is no ego "in" or "behind" 
consciousness.'13 This is Sartre's well-known rejection of Husserl's 'tran- 
scendental ego/ one of the two most important differences between 
Sartre and Husserl.14 (2) Other philosophers have proposed even weaker 
definitions of 'self-consciousness.' For example, Van Gulick holds that it 
is simply the possession of meta-psychological information.15 While I 
believe that that notion is too weak, my point here is only that my 
definition is not the weakest one in the literature. Owen Flanagan also 
recognizes a 'weaker' form of self-consciousness when he says that 'all 
subjective experience is self-conscious in the weak sense that there is 
something it is like for the subject to have that experience. This involves 
a sense that the experience is the subject's experience, that it ... occurs in 
her stream.'16 
12 See CSC 17-18 for several additional reasons. 
13 This is a quotation from the translator's introduction at TE 21 . On this point see also 
Phyllis Berdt Kenevan, 'Self-Consciousness and the Ego in the Philosophy of Sartre/ 
in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Schilpp, ed. (LaSalle: Open Court Press 
1981), ch. 7. 
14 The other major difference is Sartre's rejection of Husserl's 'bracketing' of the belief 
in the existence of outer phenomena. 
15 Robert Van Gulick, 'A Functionalist Plea for Self-Consciousness,' Philosophical 
Review 97 (1988) 149-81. 1 argue that Van Gulick's notion of self-consciousness is too 
weak in CSC 147-51. 
16 Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992), 194 
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III Sartre and the HOT Theory 
1. An initial problem: Sartre's rejection of the Freudian 
unconscious.17 
The HOT theorist asks: what makes a mental state a conscious mental 
state? This is the fundamental question that should be answered by any 
theory of consciousness. The HOT theory says that what makes a mental 
state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought di- 
rected at it.18 This allows, or even presupposes, that there can be uncon- 
scious mental states; that is, those mental states not accompanied by a 
HOT. However, Sartre explicitly rejects the existence of the Freudian 
unconscious, which would seem to rule out the existence of first-order 
nonconscious mental states. For example, Sartre says that 'pleasure 
cannot exist "before" consciousness of pleasure' (BN 14) and 'to believe 
is to know that one believes' (BN 1 14). Indeed, this is precisely what leads 
Sartre to address the problem of how so-called l?ad faith' (la mauvaise 
foi) is possible without presupposing an unconscious part of the mind. 
Sartre argues that postulating the Freudian unconscious would not even 
solve this paradox. Bad faith is basically 'lying to oneself and is com- 
monly treated as a form of self-deception.1 In any case, Sartre was not 
17 In this section I will use the terms 'unconscious' and 'nonconscious' interchange- 
ably. 
18 Of course, a full answer to the question 'What makes a higher-order thought 
"suitable"?' would require a lengthy digression that I cannot pursue here. One 
condition, for example, is that the HOT must be a momentary or occurrent state as 
opposed to a dispositional state. See CSC chapters 3 and 4 for my attempt at 
answering the above question. Moreover, the terminology can be a bit confusing. 
Sometimes the term 'thought' is used as a generic term covering all kinds of mental 
states, but it is also sometimes contrasted with 'perception.' For our purposes, we 
can think of the higher-order state as some kind of higher-order awareness. See CSC 
95-101 for some discussion of this matter. 
19 The topic of bad faith is a major issue in its own right that I cannot address here. For 
a small sample of the literature, however, see Robert Stone, 'Sartre on Bad Faith and 
Authenticity,' in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Schilpp, ed. (LaSalle: Open 
Court Press 1981), ch. 10; Jeffrey Gordon, 'Bad Faith: A Dilemma,' Philosophy 60 
(1985) 258-62; Joseph Catalano, 'Successfully Lying to Oneself: A Sartrean Perspec- 
tive,' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990) 673-93; Ronald Santoni, Bad 
Faith, Good Faith, and Authenticity in Sartre's Early Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press 1995); Yiwei Zheng, 'Ontology and Ethics in Sartre's Being and 
Nothingness: On the Conditions of the Possibility of Bad Faith,' The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 35 (1997) 265-87. 
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attempting to answer the above question in a way that would easily 
allow for unconscious first-order mental states. 
Some commentators, however, have questioned Sartre's blanket rejec- 
tion of the unconscious as apparently articulated in the section titled 'Bad 
Faith' in BN. Phyllis Sutton Morris notes how many Sartre scholars 
believe that Sartre eventually came to accept 'that there were "opaque" 
elements in our psychic lives/20 Even in BN, Morris points out that we 
find the following striking passage: 
the body is [the psyche's] substance and its perpetual condition of possibility.... It 
is this which is at the basis of the mechanistic and chemical metaphors which we 
use to classify and to explain the events of the psyche.... It is this, finally, which 
motivates and to some degree justifies psychological theories like that of the unconscious, 
problems like that of the preservation of memories. (BN 444, emphasis added) 
We also find a surprising passage at BN 437 where Sartre seems to 
endorse a belief in unconscious pain when, for example, he writes, 'my 
reading "absorbs me" and when I "forget" my pain (which does not 
mean that it has disappeared since if I happen to gain knowledge of it in 
a later reflective act, it will be given as having always been there).' The 
parenthetical remark seems to suggest that the pain existed throughout 
his reading, even when he was not conscious of it. 
Others have also argued that Sartre and Freud may not have been as 
far apart as is commonly believed. For example, Brown and Hausman 
question Sartre's commitment to the so-called 'translucency of con- 
sciousness' in comparing him to Freud.21 Ivan Soil argues that even if 
Sartre has shown that Freud's postulation of an unconscious region of 
the mind does not resolve the paradox of bad faith, it does not follow 
that we must therefore reject the notion of unconscious mental processes. 
Soil explains, 'even if the postulation of the unconscious does not resolve 
the paradox of self-deception, it is quite clear that it was not postulated 
solely to resolve that paradox. Freud justified the postulation of the 
unconscious by claiming that it helped to explain several sorts of other- 
wise incomprehensible human behavioral phenomena, such as ... 
20 Phyllis Sutton Morris, 'Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness/ 
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23 (1992) 103-19. The quotation is from 
page 115, but also see her footnote 28. 
21 Lee Brown and Alan Hausman, 'Mechanism, Intentionality, and the Unconscious: 
A Comparison of Sartre and Freud/ in The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul 
Schilpp, ed. (LaSalle: Open Court Press 1981), ch. 23. 
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dreams, memory, and various sorts of neurotic symptom formation/22 
Part of Sartre's motivation to reject the unconscious no doubt also stems 
from his (very conscious!) desire to maintain his well-known and some- 
what radical views on freedom and responsibility. As Soil puts it, 'Sartre 
also associates the postulation of a psychic unconscious with the intro- 
duction into the psychic realm of causal relationships and the freedom- 
threatening thesis of causal determinism so dear to Freud and so 
repugnant to him/23 It is certainly true that philosophers understandably 
tend to infer from a materialistic causal determinism to a lack of freedom 
and responsibility, at least in the robust sense that Sartre had in mind. 
Of course, Sartre could have instead argued that freedom enters the 
picture only at the level of conscious mentality while admitting the 
presence of unconscious mental states defined in terms of functional/be- 
havioral roles. However, it is clear that, rightly or wrongly, Sartre 
believed that introducing an unconscious realm into his theory of con- 
sciousness would threaten a belief in freedom. After all, the belief in 
causally active unconscious mental states is frequently used by determi- 
nists in response to a wide variety of arguments for free will, such as the 
well-known 'argument from deliberation' whereby we infer that we 
really could have done otherwise from the first-person observation that 
we frequently deliberate over choices and then seem to be able to 
perform more than one action at a given time. 
In any case, despite some very real questions regarding Sartre's views 
on unconscious mentality, it still seems unwise to hold that Sartre's 
position (especially in BN) can be made entirely consistent with this 
aspect of the HOT theory.24 HOT theorists are united in their unequivocal 
acceptance of unconscious mental states. Nonetheless, Sartre was clearly 
still concerned to analyze and explain the structure of conscious mental 
states, and this is a desire he shared with HOT theorists. I will hereafter 
focus on this aspect of his theory. Even if one rejects the unconscious in 
some significant way, it still seems possible to offer an informative analy- 
sis of conscious mental states. This is where I disagree with Rosenthal 
when he argues that if we treat consciousness as an intrinsic property of 
22 Ivan Soil, 'Sartre's Rejection of the Freudian Unconscious/ in The Philosophy of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, ch. 24, 586. Soil also argues that Sartre ignored or misunderstood 
some of Freud's more developed views. 
23 Ivan Soil, 'Sartre's Rejection of the Freudian Unconscious/ 602 
24 This is unlike, say, Leibniz who unambiguously believed in the unconscious and 
who also held a version of the HOT theory, I argue in 'Leibniz on Consciousness 
and Self-Consciousness/ in New Essays on the Rationalists, Rocco J. Gennaro and 
Charles Huenemann, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press 1999). 
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mental states, then conscious mental states will be simple and unanalyz- 
able.25 Descartes is the primary villain in his criticism of the view that 
consciousness is intrinsic and essential to mentality. Rosenthal defines an 
'intrinsic' (as opposed to 'extrinsic') property as follows: P is an intrinsic 
property of x if x's having P does not consist in x bearing some relation R 
to something else.26 But, as I have argued elsewhere,27 even if consciousness 
is an intrinsic property of some or all mental states, it does not follow that 
the such mental states are simple or unanalyzable. In essence, Rosenthal 
has set up a false dilemma: either accept the Cartesian view that mental 
states are essentially and intrinsically conscious (and so unanalyzable) or 
accept his version of the HOT theory whereby consciousness, or the 
so-called 'conscious making property' (the HOT), is an extrinsic property 
of mental states. But there is an informative third alternative that I call the 
'wide intrinsicality view' (WIV) and that I will argue is very close to Sartre 
theory. 
The WIV, in contrast to Rosenthal's version of the HOT theory, says 
that first-order conscious mental states are complex states containing both 
a world-directed mental state and a (nonconscious) meta-psychological 
thought (MET).28 Conscious states are thus individuated 'widely.' As 
shown in figure 2, this alternative holds that consciousness is an intrinsic 
property of conscious states while also providing an analysis of conscious 
mentality. Moreover, contra Rosenthal's contention, such states are not 
simple, but rather are complex states with parts. On my view, the MET 
is a self-conscious state and so (like Sartre) even first-order conscious 
states are self-conscious. My conscious perception of the tree is accom- 
panied by a (self-conscious) MET within the very same complex con- 
scious state. Now when I introspect on my perception, there is a 
first-order mental state which is rendered conscious by a complex 
higher-order state. Thus, introspection involves two states: a lower-order 
25 Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Consciousness/ 330, 340-8. See also David Rosenthal, 
'A Theory of Consciousness/ Report No. 40 (1990) on MIND and BRAIN. Perspec- 
tives in Theoretical Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind (ZiF), University of 
Bielefeld, 22-4. A version of that paper is reprinted in The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates, Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Guven Guzeldere, eds. (Cam- 
bridge, MA: MIT Press 1997), ch. 46. 
26 Rosenthal, 'A Theory of Consciousness/ 21-2. 
27 CSC 21-4. 1 also show that Rosenthal mistakenly argues that intrinsicality entails 
essentiality and that extrinsicality entails contingency. 
28 I will often use the expression 'meta-psychological thought' (MET) instead of 
'higher-order thought' (HOT) because, on my view, the conscious rendering state 
is part of the first-order conscious state and so is technically not 'higher-order/ 
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noncomplex mental state which is the object of a higher-order conscious 
complex state (see figure 2). I believe that the WIV offers a neater and 
simpler alternative to the standard HOT theory. 
There are a number of advantages to the WIV over Rosenthal's theory. 
I offer two here:29 
(1) The WIV can very simply accommodate the intuitive belief that 
consciousness is an intrinsic property of mental states. From the first- 
person point of view, consciousness certainly seems to be an intrinsic 
feature of mental states (e.g. our visual perceptions). After all, conscious- 
ness does not seem to be an extrinsic property like l>eing to the left of.' 
Even Rosenthal acknowledges that we should try to preserve this natural 
view if at all possible,30 but then he rejects it for the reasons given above. 
(2) The WIV also can explain the somewhat historically influential 
view that conscious mental states are, in some sense, directed at them- 
selves. Conscious mental states are 'reflexive' or 'self-referential.' This is 
a view that Sartre held (as we will see more clearly later in this section) 
and it is also articulated by Brentano, who believed that conscious mental 
states are secondarily directed at themselves.31 Brentano did not think 
that we could distinguish, say, the mental act of perceiving some object 
from the mental act of thinking that one is perceiving that object. Of 
course, strictly speaking, a conscious mental state is not self-referential 
in the sense that it is directed back at itself. There is instead an inner 
reflexivity within the complex conscious state such that the MET is 
directed at a part of the state of which it is part. In a similar way, Marjorie 
Grene says on Sartre's behalf that 'consciousness, to be consciousness, 
must be self-directed and self-contained.'32 
I suppose it is open to Rosenthal to respond that what is reflexive is 
the amalgam of the HOT and the target (i.e. lower-order) state. Perhaps 
he could simply admit that, even on his version of the HOT theory, we 
sometimes refer to that amalgam as the 'conscious state.' If this is meant 
as a shift of position to the WIV, then such a reply would be welcome. 
The problem for Rosenthal, however, is that such an admission seems 
inconsistent with much of what he says against the idea that conscious- 
ness is an intrinsic property of conscious mental states. As we saw above, 
his considered position is that consciousness is extrinsic to the target 
29 I describe five advantages in CSC 26-30. 
30 Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Consciousness/ 331 
31 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (New York: Humanities 
Press 1973 [1874]) 
32 Marjorie Grene, Sartre (New York: New Viewpoints 1973), 121 
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Figure 2. 
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state and he is frequently at great pains to demonstrate that Brentano's 
view is mistaken.3 
In any case, we can see that even if Sartre did not believe in noncon- 
scious mental states, it is crucial to separate that view from his analysis 
of consciousness. There are two different questions here: (1) Are mental 
states essentially conscious? and (2) Are conscious mental states essen- 
tially self-conscious? It certainly seems possible to hold that the answer 
to (1) is yes while the answer to (2) is also yes. Most of us would answer 
no to (1), but I would also answer yes to (2). It is clear, however, that 
these questions are independent and an answer to one need not logically 
lead us to any particular answer to the other. So mental states might not 
be essentially conscious, but conscious mental states can still be essen- 
tially self-conscious. In much of his discussion on bad faith, Sartre 
himself seems to have been unnecessarily concerned that answering no 
to (1) would cause problems for an affirmative answer to (2). This is 
presumably what Wider means when, in examining possible counterex- 
amples to the thesis that consciousness entails self-consciousness, she 
says she will bypass the central counterexample Sartre focuses on in 
[BN] - the Freudian unconscious' (BNC 93). It is not clear to me why 
either Sartre or Wider would view the rejection of the unconscious as a 
counterexample to the thesis that conscious states are self-conscious. 
Let us now proceed to another aspect of the HOT theory addressed by 
Sartre. 
2. The infinite regress. 
As I mentioned in Section II, the HOT theorist avoids definitional circu- 
larity and an infinite regress by explaining that the HOT is not itself 
33 See also, for example, much of Rosenthal's argument in 'Thinking That one Thinks/ 
in Consciousness, Martin Davies and Glyn W. Humphreys, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell 
1993), 197-223. Among other things, Rosenthal argues there that HOTs cannot be 
intrinsic to the conscious state because it would seem almost contradictory to have, 
for example, a doubt that it is raining but also an affirmative thought that I am in 
such a state. In other words, the very same conscious state cannot have parts with 
more than one mental attitude, e.g. doubting and affirming (assertoric). However, 
it is unclear why this should be so and that there is really a problem here for the 
WTV. In such a case, we would have a first-order conscious doubt directed at the 
weather accompanied by a MET of the form T (nonconsciously but assertorically) 
think that I am doubting it is raining/ The MET affirms the doubt and that 
affirmation is what makes the lower-order doubt conscious. Thus the complex 
conscious state is still a first-order world-directed conscious doubt, albeit with an 
assertoric meta-psychological component. 
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conscious when one has a first-order conscious state. Otherwise, we 
would be explaining consciousness by appealing to consciousness, 
which is circular. Moreover, we would have an infinite regress because 
for every conscious state there would have to be a higher-order conscious 
state and so on ad infinitum.3* So, for example, on the WIV, the MET is a 
nonconscious part of a first-order conscious mental state. Sartre interest- 
ingly noticed a similar problem, but instead of straightforwardly re- 
sponding in like manner, he first says the following in TE: 
All reflecting consciousness is, indeed, in itself unreflected, and a new act of the 
third degree is necessary in order to posit it. Moreover, there is no infinite regress 
here, since a consciousness has no need at all of a reflecting consciousness in order 
to be conscious of itself. It simply does not posit itself as an object. (TE 45) 
And then in BN Sartre puts it as follows: 
Either we stop at any one term of the series - the known, the knower known, the 
knower known by the knower, etc. In this case the totality of the phenomenon falls 
into the unknown; that is, we always bump up against a non-conscious reflection 
and a final term. Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress (idea ideae ideae, 
etc.), which is absurd.... Are we obliged after all to introduce the law of this 
[knower-known] dyad into consciousness? Consciousness of self is not dual. If we 
wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation 
of the self to itself. (BN 12) 
What are we to make of these passages? A full answer to this question 
will not be entirely clear until the end of Section IV. However, to 
anticipate some of that discussion, we can see that in the TE quote Sartre 
is first recognizing that when there is 'reflecting' (i.e. introspective) 
consciousness, there must be 'a new act of the third degree.' This is 
reminiscent of the HOT theorist's contention that a third-order state is 
necessary for introspection. But there is no infinite regress because 'a 
consciousness has no need of a reflecting consciousness in order to be 
conscious of itself which can be taken as meaning 'conscious mental 
states need not have a reflective (or introspective) state directed at it in 
order to be self-conscious.' The idea that a conscious mental state need 
not be accompanied by introspection is certainly the view of any HOT 
theorist. One can, for example, have an outer directed conscious mental 
state of a table without being introspectively conscious of one's own 
34 For an example of this type of error, see Peter Carruthers, 'Brute Experience/ Journal 
of Philosophy 86 (1989) 258-69. See my reply to Carruthers in 'Brute Experience and 
the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness/ Philosophical Papers 22 (1993) 
51-69. 
This content downloaded from 192.206.10.53 on Sat, 6 Jul 2013 17:47:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness 307 
perception. After all, one's conscious attention cannot be directed both at 
the table and at one's own mental state. 
However, Sartre still must account for the non-positional awareness in 
pre-reflective consciousness that I described briefly in Section I. For exam- 
ple, Sartre holds that 'every positional consciousness of an object is at the 
same time a non-positional consciousness of itself (BN 13). In the TE 
passage, Sartre is making the point that such non-positional conscious- 
ness of itself 'does not posit itself as an object.' As I will argue in the next 
subsection, this is tantamount to holding the WIV where the non-posi- 
tional self-consciousness is part of the conscious mental state. Such self- 
consciousness is not separate from the mental state it is directed at, and this 
is why Sartre says that it 'does not posit an object. ' So despite Sartre's claim 
that all consciousness is consciousness of something, he is apparently 
saying that, when it comes to such self-consciousness, it does not really 
posit an object, or at least not a distinct object. After all, he does call it 
'non-positional self-consciousness' (BN 26, emphasis added). This is also 
why he uses the 'of [de] in parentheses merely out of 'grammatical neces- 
sity' when speaking of such non-positional self-consciousness (of) self.35 
Similarly, in the BN quotation, Sartre avoids the regress by first 
rejecting any separation between such self-consciousness and the world- 
directed conscious state; that is, by rejecting the 'knower-known' dyad. 
Sartre then makes it clear that a conscious state, and so self-conscious- 
ness, is 'not dual.' And so, again, 'if we wish to avoid an infinite regress, 
there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of the self to itself 
(BN 12). I will return to this last statement in Section IV, but we can 
already see how Sartre is trying to make room for some kind of meta- 
psychological awareness which is part o/each conscious mental state. 
But why not just call such meta-psychological awareness a 'noncon- 
scious thought (or awareness)'? Sartre's reluctance to call the 'non-posi- 
tional awareness' in pre-reflective consciousness a 'nonconscious 
thought' is perhaps partly due to his rejection of the first-order uncon- 
scious. However, I suggest that we must interpret Sartre as logically 
committed to the existence of nonconscious METs. What else is a 'non- 
positional self-awareness' except some kind of nonconscious meta-psy- 
chological mental state? I cannot understand it any other way. Such an 
awareness is clearly a mental state of some kind. Indeed, this seems to be 
the standard interpretation offered by numerous commentators. For 
example, Thomas Busch tells us that 'unreflective consciousness intends 
or posits an object other than itself and is simultaneously non-position- 
35 See BN 14. Also see Catalano, Commentary, 32-3; and BNC 86-7 and note 14. 
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ally self-aware,'36 and Peter Caws explains that Sartre insists on 'the 
necessary accompaniment of every act of consciousness with a state of 
unreflective self -awareness/37 Furthermore, either 'non-positional self- 
awareness' is conscious (which is absurd and would lead to the infinite 
regress) or it is a nonconscious mental state of some kind (which is 
therefore the only viable alternative). One's conscious mind cannot be 
directed both at outer objects and at one's own mind at the same time, 
and so the non-positional self-awareness that accompanies one's pre-re- 
flective (positional) consciousness of outer objects must be noncon- 
scious. 
3. Sartre and the WIV: 
Additional textual and commentator support. 
To support further the close connection between Sartre's theory and the 
WIV, let us look extensively at some primary texts and secondary 
sources. My aim is to show that Sartre held a view very much like the 
WIV, though he used his own unique terminology. Figure 3 is a side by 
side comparison of the two theories. 
To remind us of Sartre's overall position, Hazel Barnes says the 
following: 
by nature all consciousness is self-consciousness.... When I am aware of a chair, I 
am non-reflectively conscious of my awareness. But when I deliberately think of my 
awareness, this is a totally new consciousness; and here only am I explicitly positing 
my awareness or myself as an object of reflection. The pre-reflective cogito is a 
non-positional self-consciousness. (BN xi) 
As we have already seen, this is in much the same spirit as the HOT 
theory. Let us now first look at the structure of pre-reflective conscious 
mental states. Recall Sartre's claim that 'every positional consciousness 
of an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself 
(BN 13). Catalano, for example, also explains, 'consciousness is directly 
an awareness of something other than itself and simultaneously and 
indirectly an awareness of itself, as when we are absorbed in a book, we 
are directly aware of reading and indirectly aware of ourselves as read- 
36 Thomas W. Busch, 'Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being and Nothingness Reconsid- 
ered/ in Jean-Paul Sartre: Contemporary Approaches to His Philosophy, Hugh Silverman 
and Frederick Elliston, eds. (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press 1980), 19, 
emphasis added 
37 Peter Caws, Sartre (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1979), 55 
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ing.'38 And Morris says that 'we are usually directly aware of an [outer] 
object, but not explicitly of ourselves being aware of (desiring, thinking 
of, etc.) of that object/ Thus when our consciousness is outer-directed 
we are not explicitly (i.e. reflectively) aware of the lower-order state, but 
we are implicitly (i.e. non-positionally) aware of ourselves being aware 
of the outer object. Morris also explains that 'our most common con- 
scious activities are prereflective or unreflective - not in the sense of 
being thoughtless, but rather in the sense of being explicitly directed 
toward objects other than ourselves and our actions.... It is only when 
someone takes his own conscious activities as the object of his attention 
that he has begun to reflect in Sartre's sense.'40 
To bring this even closer to the WIV version of the HOT theory, 
consider the following passage: 
The immediate [pre-reflective] consciousness which I have of perceiving does not 
permit me either to judge [it].... It does not know my perception, does not posit it; all 
that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the outside, 
toward the world. In turn, this spontaneous consciousness of my perception is 
constitutive of my perceptive consciousness. (BN 12-13) 
Similarly, Sartre says 'Consciousness (of) pleasure is constitutive of the 
pleasure as the very mode of its own existence' (BN 14, emphasis added). 
So Sartre is recognizing, as he did in avoiding the infinite regress, that 
the non-positional self-consciousness is part of the lower-order state. It 
is 'constitutive' of the first-order conscious state. 
Perhaps even more striking is the following passage: 
it is the very nature of consciousness to exist "in a circle".... We understand now 
why the first consciousness of consciousness is not positional; it is because it is one 
with the consciousness of which it is consciousness. (BN 13-4) 
Looking at figure 3 one can see how this accords with pre-reflective 
consciousness. The non-positional (self-) consciousness is the 'first con- 
sciousness of consciousness' and 'it is one with the consciousness of which 
it is conscious [i.e. the world-directed conscious state].' I believe that this 
is what Sartre meant by saying that consciousness exists 'in a circle.' 
It is also clear that Sartre views the non-positional self-awareness 
within pre-reflective consciousness as a form of self-consciousness. Oth- 
38 Catalano, Commentary, 33 
39 Morris, Sartre's Concept of a Person, 31 
40 Morris, 'Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness/ 108 
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erwise, he would not be able to claim that all consciousness is self-con- 
sciousness. In the same way, on my view, the nonconscious MET in a 
world-directed conscious state is a form of self-consciousness. Recall that 
in Section II, I defined self-consciousness as simply having meta-psycho- 
logical thoughts, even when the MET is not itself conscious. Sartre makes 
numerous references to self-consciousness in much the same spirit: 'This 
[non-positional] self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new 
consciousness.... [it is] a quality of the positional consciousness' (BN 14). 
He speaks of 'non-positional self-consciousness' (BN 26), 'non-thetic 
self-consciousness' (BN 120), and says that 'pre-reflective consciousness 
is self-consciousness' (BN 123). Thus Catalano tells us that 'conscious- 
ness, by its very being as an awareness, is pre-reflectively a (self-) con- 
sciousness.'41 
Moving up the line, so to speak, to reflective consciousness, it is widely 
acknowledged that part of Sartre's motivation for distinguishing reflec- 
tive and pre-reflective consciousness is to separate himself from Des- 
cartes who Sartre believed ignored the pre-reflective cogito in his 
methodological doubt. The pre-reflective cogito is actually a necessary 
condition of reflective consciousness. In the same way, on the WIV, one 
cannot have reflective (i.e. introspective) states without first having a 
first-order state. It is precisely when the first MET becomes conscious that 
one is reflecting. Thus, we find Sartre saying, 'it is the non-reflective 
consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflec- 
tive cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito' (BN 13). 
Moreover, 'the unreflected has the ontological priority over the reflected 
because the unreflected does not need to be reflected in order to exist, 
and because reflection presupposes the intervention of a second-degree 
consciousness' (TE 57-8). In short, reflective states presuppose pre-reflec- 
tive states, but not vice versa. As Busch puts it, 'the unreflected act, must 
be differentiated from the subsequent, or secondary, operation whereby 
a reflecting consciousness comes to bear in an objective way upon the 
unreflective or pre-reflective consciousness.'42 
Recall that in Section I we noted how Sartre defined reflection as 'a 
consciousness which posits a consciousness'(TE 62). He also says that 
reflection is 'an operation of the second degree ... performed by a[n act 
of] consciousness directed upon consciousness, a consciousness which 
takes consciousness as an object' (TE 44). Thus the higher-order (i.e. 
41 Catalano, Commentary, 32 
42 Thomas Busch, The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre's 
Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1990), 5 
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second-order) reflecting consciousness 'posits' a lower-order conscious- 
ness, as is shown in figure 3. We can call the higher-order complex state 
'the reflecting consciousness' and the lower-order state 'the reflected- 
on.' And so reflection, for both Sartre and the WIV, involves a reflecting 
consciousness directed at an inner reflected-on object (i.e. mental state). 
So 'the reflecting consciousness posits the consciousness reflected-on, as 
its object. In the act of reflecting I pass judgment on the consciousness 
reflected-on' (BN 12-13). And also 'reflection is the for-itself conscious of 
itself. As the for-itself is already a non-thetic [i.e. non-positional] self-con- 
sciousness, we are accustomed to represent reflection as a new con- 
sciousness ... directed on the consciousness reflected-on' (BN 212). 
Now one might wonder in looking at figure 3: does Sartre really also 
hold that the higher-order ('reflecting') state is a complex state in the 
same way as the WIV holds? I think the answer is yes, partly because it 
is the only way for Sartre to be consistent in his analysis. Much like the 
WIV, what goes for lower-order conscious states must also go for higher- 
order conscious states. Morris agrees when she says that 'the act of 
reflection exhibits the same internal dimensions of focused/non-focused 
awareness as do prereflective acts of consciousness.'43 These 'internal 
dimensions' are present in the complex higher-order reflecting state in 
the same way as they are in a pre-reflective conscious state. Thomas 
Busch, in a similar way, explains: 
The reflective consciousness intends in a positional manner the pre-reflective con- 
sciousness. Pre-reflective consciousness intends in a positional manner some object 
other than itself, but both levels, in addition ... are non-positionally self-aware.... It is 
important to note that the implicit, or non-positional, self-awareness exists on both levels, 
pre-reflective and reflective.** 
Reflective consciousness intends or posits an object, but in its case the object is 
another act of consciousness. The reflective consciousness is also non-positionally self- 
aware.... The basic structure of consciousness, in either case, is the same: awareness of an 
object and simultaneous awareness of being aware of the object.*5 
Such quotations fit nicely with my comparison of Sartre's theory of 
reflective consciousness and the explanation offered by the WIV. The 
43 Morris, 'Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness/ 108 
44 Thomas Busch, The Power of Consciousness and the Force of Circumstances in Sartre's 
Philosophy, 7, emphasis added 
45 Thomas Busch, 'Sartre's Use of the Reduction: Being and Nothingness Reconsidered/ 
19, emphasis added 
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higher-order reflecting state has the same internal structure as a first-or- 
der conscious state, but in the former case its object is another mental 
state whereas in the latter case it is an outer object. 
Thus, to summarize, it is clear that Sartre views 'non-positional self- 
awareness' as a form of self-consciousness since he believed that first-or- 
der outer-directed conscious states are also self-conscious states. Like a 
HOT theorist, however, he also recognized a higher-order form of self- 
consciousness which he called 'reflection' in BN (instead of 'introspec- 
tion'). So when one is in a first-order conscious mental state, one has a 
complex state such that one is positionally aware of an outer object but 
also non-positionally aware of that awareness. When one is in a second- 
order reflective state, one has a complex higher-order conscious 'reflect- 
ing' state directed at (or positionally aware of) a first-order 'reflected-on' 
state of consciousness. In this case, the complex second-order state is also 
constituted by both positional awareness (of the lower-order state) and 
a non-positional awareness of itself. 
4. Two types of reflection. 
In order to complete the discussion up to this point it is necessary to 
mention briefly Sartre's distinction between pure and impure reflection. 
As I noted at the end of section one, my use of the term 'reflection' until 
now has been short for what Sartre calls 'pure reflection.' This is because 
it is pure reflection that is closer to the notion of 'reflecting on one's 
current states of mind.' Pure reflection is more of an 'immediate reflec- 
tion' on ourselves or on the present that has just been made past.46 On 
the other hand, impure reflection is more on our 'remote past' and is a 
'more deliberate and, therefore, cognitive reflection.' Impure reflection 
is the 'reflection on ourselves as a succession of states.'4 Although the 
structure of both pure and impure reflection is the same in the sense that 
they both involve conscious higher-order states directed at lower-order 
states, impure reflection can also take already past mental states as 
objects and so can be described as a 'knowledge of myself that 'fixes the 
for-itself as an in-itself.'48 On the other hand, 'in pure reflection con- 
sciousness attempts to be present to itself as a present moment of 
consciousness' (BNC 79). In Sartre's own words, 'pure reflection [is] the 
46 See, e.g., Catalano, Commentary, 126, 129-130. 
47 The previous three brief quotations are from Catalano's Commentary 130, 126, 130 
respectively. 
48 Catalano, Commentary, 130 
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simple presence of the reflective for-itself to the for-itself reflected-on' 
(BN 218). On the other hand, impure reflection 'constitutes the succes- 
sion of psychic facts or psyche' (BN 223), though this 'includes pure 
reflection as its original structure' (BN 224). 
I have also distinguished between two forms of introspection (i.e. 
reflection).49 Momentary focused introspection only involves a brief con- 
scious HOT while deliberate introspection involves the use of reason and 
a more sustained inner-directed conscious thinking over time. Some- 
times we consciously think to ourselves in a deliberate manner, e.g., in 
thinking about our philosophical views or our life goals. But one might 
also consciously think about a mental state without deliberating in any 
way, e.g., momentarily think about a memory or briefly consciously focus 
on a pain or emotion. In these cases, one is not engaged in deliberation 
or reasoning. Many animals, for example, seem capable of this kind of 
introspection even if they cannot deliberate, though both types of intro- 
spection still involve having conscious HOTs directed at lower order 
mental states. 
It is tempting to identify Sartre's pure reflection with my momentary 
focused introspection and his impure reflection with my deliberate 
introspection, but that would be a mistake mainly because it seems to 
me that we can and often do deliberate about our current states of mind. 
We might, for example, be engaged in reflective deliberate examination 
of our own current philosophical beliefs. While Sartre is right that we 
may reflect on our 'past' succession of mental states, he seems to reserve 
such deliberation to impure reflection. However, deliberate introspec- 
tion can be both pure and impure. 
IV The Unity Problem 
In this Section, I apply the results from Section III to what I will call 'the 
unity and separation problem/ or 'the unity problem' for short, which 
is vividly presented by Kathleen Wider.50 Although I am somewhat in 
agreement with Wider's criticism of Sartre, I show how we can defend 
Sartre to at least some degree. 
So what is the unity problem? In short, it is this: how can a lower-order 
state be the object of a meta-psychological state while being the very same 
49 See CSC 19-21. 
50 This is related to what Wider calls her 'internal critique' in BNC ch. 3, but the unity 
problem is most forcefully argued in Wider's 'Through the Looking Glass: Sartre 
on Knowledge and the Pre-reflective Cogito/ Man and World 22 (1989) 329-43. 1 will 
hereafter refer to this paper as TLG. 
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state (particularly since Sartre also maintains that there is knowledge of 
the lower-order state)? I believe we have seen how the WIV can help us 
understand how this is possible on the pre-reflective level if we view the 
MET as part o/the complex lower-order conscious state. We can at least 
see how one mental state can be 'directed at' another while still being 
part of the same (complex) state, even though Sartre himself clearly 
struggles with the details of his theory on this point. While this problem 
is perhaps even more apparent on the reflective level, Wider argues that 
it is present on the pre-reflective level as well. She points out, for 
example, that Sartre says 'to believe is to know that one believes' (BN 114). 
The problem is that, for Sartre, consciousness is not the same as knowl- 
edge. One can be conscious of x and not have knowledge of x according 
to Sartre's use of these terms. 'Knowledge is nothing other than the 
presence of being to the For-itself.' (BN 295) Knowledge involves a 
separation of the knower and the known object. Thus, even on the 
pre-reflective level, Sartre cannot maintain both that non-positional 
self-consciousness is knowledge of the 'lower part' of the first-order 
conscious state and then maintain that there is no separation between 
the two: ' ... presence to always implies duality, at least a virtual separa- 
tion. The presence of being to itself implies a detachment on the part of 
being in relation to itself ... But if we ask ourselves ... what it is which 
separates the subject from himself, we are forced to admit that it is 
nothing/ (BN 124) As Wider puts it, ' ... to know an object requires that 
one not be the object. Knowledge involves negation, a separation of the 
knower from the known ... Presence involves duality and separation ... 
' 
(TLG 338) But the WIV does allow for a 'duality' within the pre-reflective 
level, just not for any literal 'separation' between the MET [i.e. non-posi- 
tional self-consciousness] and the other part of the complex conscious 
state. Perhaps this is what Sartre meant by a 'virtual separation;' namely, 
a separation within a complex conscious state. 
Although the WIV can help Sartre to some degree, Wider is correct 
that he continues to have a problem. Even if I am right in interpreting 
Sartre as holding the WIV on the pre-reflective level, the unity problem 
still remains with respect to the above remarks about knowledge. I 
believe that Sartre did have something like the WIV in mind, but was 
simply struggling with how to characterize the relationship between the 
parts of the complex pre-reflective conscious state. Speaking of a 'duality 
within a unity' makes sense on the WIV. There is also sense to be made 
of the claim that there is 'nothing' between the parts, since they are part 
of the same conscious mental state. So some of the tension in Sartre's 
thought can be relieved by my analysis. However, Sartre still runs into 
serious problems and ambiguities when describing whether or not non- 
positional self-consciousness is a form of knowledge. It is perhaps under- 
standable, however, why Sartre struggled so much with this problem. 
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Like the WIV, he is trying to make sense of a 'directedness' or 'aboutness' 
within the pre-reflective level, but, in doing so, he sometimes charac- 
terizes that relation as a kind of knowledge.51 
Recall that we confronted a version of this problem in section III.2 
while addressing the threat of an infinite regress. Sartre explained that 
'if we wish to avoid an infinite regress, there must be an immediate, 
non-cognitive relation of the self to itself (BN 12). Indeed, Wider rightly 
emphasizes the term 'non-cognitive' in this quotation to support her 
contention that, at least in the Introduction to BN, Sartre did not want 
there to be a knowledge relation between the parts of pre-reflective 
consciousness (i.e., between non-positional self-consciousness and its 
'object'). Although the French term Sartre uses for 'cognitive' [cogitif] is 
not identical with his usual term for 'knowledge' [connaissance], it does 
seem reasonable to take 'non cogitif as at least implying 'not knowledge.' 
In comparison to the HOT theory, it is worth briefly digressing here to 
mention the importance of the term 'immediate' in the BN 12 quotation. 
On the HOT theory, the relation between the HOT (or MET) and the 
lower-order conscious state must be immediate. The meta-awareness of 
the lower-order state must be direct; that is, the person is not aware of 
the conscious state in virtue of being aware of any other state. This is 
much like Sartre's definition of 'immediacy,' which, he says, 'is the 
absence of any mediator; that is obvious, for otherwise the mediator 
alone would be known and not what is mediated' (BN 247). The main 
reason for this condition on the HOT theory is to avoid alleged counter- 
examples purporting to show that one can have a HOT directed at one's 
own mental state of, say, anger at one's boss, but still not feel the anger. 
This could happen if, for example, one is confronted by another's obser- 
vation of one's behavior or one is told so by a trusted psychotherapist. 
But such HOTs are not directly or immediately aware of the mental state 
of anger; rather, they are inferred by virtue of being immediately aware 
of my behavior or someone else. This is also why a HOT theorist should 
not allow the conscious rendering HOT to arise via inference or as a result 
of indirect evidence. It is wisest for a HOT theorist to hold that the HOT 
(or MET) must meet this so-called 'noninferentiality condition' in order 
for the lower-order state to be conscious.52 
51 Wider does point out that Sartre recognizes the problem to some extent, but he is 
much too quick to dismiss it. See TLG 334. 
52 For more on this condition, see CSC 84-7, and Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Con- 
sciousness/ 335-6. 
This content downloaded from 192.206.10.53 on Sat, 6 Jul 2013 17:47:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jean-Paul Sartre and the HOT Theory of Consciousness 317 
Let us return to the unity problem. I believe that it arises in even more 
dramatic fashion at the reflective level despite some help from the WIV 
and our figure 3 comparison. Sartre seems to contradict himself on the 
question of whether or not there is a knowledge relation between the 
higher-order (complex) reflecting state and the lower-order reflected-on 
state. For example, he says that 'the reflected-on is not wholly an object 
but a quasi-object for [pure] reflection' (BN 218, emphasis added). What 
does a 'quasi-object' mean in this context? And to the question 'Is [pure] 
reflection a form of knowledge?' Sartre first tells us that 'reflection is a 
knowledge; of that there is no doubt. It is provided with a positional 
character; it affirms the consciousness reflected-on' (BN 218). But he then 
soon after contradicts or at least weakens that claim by saying that the 
reflective 'does not detach itself completely from the reflected-on' and 
'reflection is a recognition rather than knowledge' (BN 218, emphasis 
added). It is never made clear just how such 'recognition' differs from 
'knowledge.' Thus on both levels, Wider summarizes the tension by 
explaining that 
in order to defend his claim that there is duality even in the unity of pre-reflective 
consciousness, [Sartre] illegitimately introduces cognitive elements into the discus- 
sion of consciousness at that level [and] in order to reassert the unity of conscious- 
ness at the level of pure reflection, he weakens and at times abandons his claim that 
pure reflection is knowledge. (TLG 340) 
Indeed, Wider argues that the problem is even more serious when we 
consider that it also infects Sartre's characterization of impure reflection. 
Sartre unambiguously wants to maintain that impure reflection in a form 
of knowledge since this occurs when 'the reflective consciousness tries 
to take a point of view on the consciousness reflected on and thus 
attempts to view the reflected consciousness as an object' (BNC 77). 
Sartre describes impure reflection as the attempt 'to apprehend the 
reflected-on as in-itself in order to make itself be that in-itself which is 
apprehended' (BN 224, emphasis added). But Sartre then has difficulty 
distinguishing pure from impure reflection when he characterizes pure 
reflection in terms of knowledge. And then when he treats pre-reflective 
self-consciousness as a form of knowledge, Sartre has difficulty separat- 
ing it from either type of reflection. So according to Wider: 
[Sartre's] account fails on the level of pure reflection because [he] offers no account of 
self-consciousness on this level that succeeds in distinguishing pure reflection from 
the self-consciousness of pre-reflective consciousness without at the same time caus- 
ing the collapse of his distinction between pure and impure reflection. (BNC 91) 
But even if Sartre's view is hopeless, or even contradictory, on the 
knowledge aspect of all this, I suggest that our analysis of the structure 
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of reflective states (in terms of figure 3) can shed some light on the nature 
of this problem and relieve some of the tension. Given his definition of 
knowledge, Sartre probably should have said that knowledge appears 
neither at the pre-reflective nor at the pure reflective level, and then left 
knowledge only for impure reflection. Sartre had something like the WIV 
in mind, but was not very clear about how to characterize the relation- 
ship between the complex higher-order reflecting state and the lower- 
order reflected-on state, particularly since knowledge involves a 
'separation.' In an attempt to stress the unity of reflective states, Sartre 
even flirts with characterizing reflective consciousness as something like 
what I have in figure 4; that is, treat reflection as one very complex 
conscious state ('one big circle') with parts including both the reflecting 
and reflected-on consciousnesses. So, like the pre-reflective level, there 
is a kind of 'separation' or 'duality,' but still within a 'unity.' This would 
also again help to explain his ambiguous treatment of the knowledge 
relation. 
Figure 4 may indeed represent his considered mature view, but we 
can also find textual support for it as early as in TE: 
there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting consciousness and the reflected consciousness 
(to the point that the reflecting consciousness could not exist without the reflected 
consciousness). But the fact remains that we are in the presence of a synthesis of two 
consciousnesses, one of which is consciousness of 'the other. (TE 44, emphasis added) 
reflection and reflected are only one ... and the interiority of the one fuses with that of the 
other. To posit interiority before oneself, however, is necessarily to give it the load 
of an object. This transpires as if interiority closed upon itself and proffered us only 
its outside; as if one had to "circle about" it in order to understand it. (TE 84, 
emphasis added) 
In BN Sartre also speaks of the reflective consciousness and 'its abso- 
lute unity with the consciousness reflected-on' (BN 212) and says that 
'reflection is one being, just like the unreflective for-itself , not an addition 
of being' (BN 215). So, for example, my reflecting consciousness directed 
at my desire to write a good paper is part of the same reflective state as 
the lower-order desire itself. There is only one act of consciousness at the 
reflective level. A contemporary mind-brain materialist might reason- 
ably say that the entire reflective state is one global brain state with some 
areas of the brain directed at others. Once again, however, Sartre strug- 
gles on the very same page with how to phrase the matter: 'It is agreed 
then that reflection must be united to that which is reflected-on by a bond 
of being, that the reflective [i.e. reflecting consciousness] must be the 
consciousness reflected-on. But on the other hand, there can be no question 
of a total identification of the reflective with that reflected-on' (BN 213, 
emphasis added; cf. BN 395-6). I believe that figure 4 best represents 
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Figure 4. 
what Sartre means here. There is a 'unity' and a I^ond' between the 
reflecting consciousness and the reflected-on consciousness, but they 
cannot be 'totally identified' with each other. Rather, as the above 
quotations make clear, they are part of one Toeing' (i.e. one conscious 
mental state) 'fused' together into an 'indissoluble unity/ 
In summary and restricting the matter to the reflective level, it might 
be helpful to put the unity problem by saying that Sartre obviously 
cannot consistently hold all of the following propositions: 
(1) Knowledge requires a separation between the knower and the 
known object. 
(2) Reflection involves knowledge of the 'reflected-on' state. 
(3) The 'reflected-on' is not completely detached from the 'reflecting' 
state. 
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I have conceded that there is much confusion and ambiguity in Sartre's 
use of the terms 'knowledge/ 'separation/ and 'detachment.' If he means 
'literal separation' implying two distinct 'objects' or mental states, then 
indeed we have an inconsistent triad; that is, he could not hold that both 
(1) and (3) are true if we accept his initial adherence to (2). Of course, if 
we allow Sartre to back off of (2), then (1) and (3) remain consistent but 
at the cost of trying to understand the difference between 'recognition' 
and 'knowledge.' However, Sartre could mean 'virtual separation' in (1) 
which I suggest could yield the more coherent position represented in 
figure 4. Recall the quotation from Sartre that 'presence to always implies 
duality, at least a virtual separation. The presence of being to itself implies 
a detachment on the part of being in relation to itself.... But if we ask 
ourselves ... what it is which separates the subject from himself, we are 
forced to admit that it is nothing' (BN 124, first emphasis added). All three 
claims could then be consistent. Proposition (1) is true because a virtual 
separation can allow for knowledge within the very complex reflective 
state. Proposition (2) is true since the reflecting state would have knowl- 
edge of the reflected-on state. And (3) could also be true because, as 
figure 4 indicates, the reflecting state and the reflected-on state are not 
completely detached but are part of the same complex reflective state. 
We can then also understand what Sartre meant by a 'quasi-object' when 
he said that 'the reflected-on is not wholly an object but a quasi-object for 
[pure] reflection' (BN 218, emphasis added). A quasi-object, in this 
context, would be a reflected-on mental state that is only virtually sepa- 
rated from the reflecting state. A quasi-object is not an entirely distinct 
object of knowledge.53 
Unfortunately, one further complication arises when Sartre says such 
things as: 
reflection - if it is to be apodictic [i.e. certain] evidence - demands that the reflective 
be that which is reflected-on. But to the extent that reflection is knowledge, the 
53 As we saw in Section ffl.l, it is perhaps once again open to Rosenthal to argue that, 
even though the HOTs are distinct and extrinsic from their targets, the unity in 
question is the amalgam of both states. The problem for Rosenthal here is twofold: 
(a) As was mentioned in Section III.l, if 'unity' means 'one single conscious state/ 
as Sartre ultimately seems to believe, then much of what Rosenthal says is at odds 
with this way of understanding the HOT theory, (b) On the reflective level, recall 
that Rosenthal's theory has three distinct states in contrast to what is expressed in 
figure 4. This would then make it even more difficult for him to treat the unity in 
question simply as an amalgam of three distinct parts. As I hope I have made clear 
in this section, however, I believe that we are all struggling to make sense of this 
'parts in a unity' idea. Nonetheless, I have argued that the WFV holds out the best 
prospect for success. 
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reflected-on must necessarily be the object for the reflective; and this implies a 
separation of being. Thus it is necessary that the reflective simultaneously be and 
not be the reflected-on. (BN 213-14, first emphasis added) 
Our analysis thus far can handle the last part of this quotation, but 
another aspect of the unity problem results from Sartre's apparent desire 
to maintain a Cartesian infallibility thesis about one's own mental states. 
Indeed, Wider prominently mentions this thesis at the very beginning of 
TLG. Any claim of infallibility, of course, goes well beyond any ordinary 
notion of knowledge that we have thus far considered. But, just as we 
saw in Section III.l regarding Sartre's related rejection of the uncon- 
scious, things are not so simple. In TE we find this rather striking 
passage: 
Is it therefore necessary to conclude that the [reflective] state is immanent and 
certain? Surely not. We must not make of reflection a mysterious and infallible 
power, nor believe that everything reflection attains is indubitable because attained 
by reflection. Reflection has limits, both limits of validity and limits in fact. (TE 61-2; 
cf . TE 65) 
So despite Sartre's frequent talk of the 'translucency' of consciousness, 
it is not at all clear that some kind of Cartesian 'transparency' or 'infalli- 
bility' follows. Many others also have serious doubts about Sartre's 
adherence to such a strong Cartesian position. Morris questions any 
inference from 'translucency' to 'transparency' and tells us that 'Sartre 
neither says nor means that consciousness is always perfectly transpar- 
ent.'54 Catalano argues against the inference from translucency to infal- 
libility: 'Sartre's claim that consciousness is translucent does not imply 
that we always have a correct understanding of that which we are 
aware.'55 And Brown and Hausman question Sartre's commitment to the 
claim that the mind is translucent to itself by disputing that Sartre 
believed in the transparency and infallibility of the mental.56 
There is one final and very puzzling aspect of Sartre's view that is 
worth briefly raising at this point. Recall from Section I that Sartre says 
that consciousness or the for-itself 'is not what it is and is what it is not' 
(BN 120, 127). This is commonly taken as Sartre denying that the Law of 
Identity, which says that each thing is identical to itself, applies to 
54 Phyllis Sutton Morris, 'Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness/ 105 
55 Joseph Catalano, 'Successfully Lying to Oneself: A Sartrean Perspective/ 680 
56 Lee Brown and Alan Hausman, 'Mechanism, Intentionality, and the Unconscious: 
A Comparison of Sartre and Freud/ esp. 541ff. and 552 
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consciousness. Indeed, such a view plays a prominent role throughout 
BN. But how could this be? How could anything not be identical with 
itself? Now some of Sartre's discussion of this matter goes well beyond 
the scope of this paper and has to do with the temporality of conscious- 
ness, which is a major topic in its own right.57 However, Sartre also 
speaks as if such a denial applies to the structure of conscious mental 
states, which is our primary concern in this paper. Moreover, he seemed 
to think that denying the Law followed from his view that consciousness 
is self-consciousness. I believe that Sartre was mistaken, but let us see 
exactly why. One place where he discusses this issue is back at BN 114 
in describing conscious belief: 
To believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one believes is no longer 
to believe. Thus to believe is not to believe any longer because that is only to believe 
- this is the unity of one and the same non-thetic consciousness.... To believe is 
not-to-believe. (BN 114) 
The idea seems to be that conscious mental states and, in this case, 
conscious belief is not identical to itself. As Wider puts it: '[Conscious 
belief] is and is not what it is. Belief is belief but because it is self-con- 
scious it is not belief (TLG 334). I agree with Wider when she says that 
she fails 'to see how it follows from the fact that self-awareness is a 
property of pre-reflective consciousness that an act of consciousness at 
the pre-reflective level, such as belief, is not itself (TLG 336). But given 
our analysis in this and the previous section, we can more clearly see 
Sartre's confusion here. I have argued that pre-reflective conscious 
states, for Sartre, have a dual and complex nature including (in this case) 
both a world-directed belief and a non-positional self-awareness or self- 
consciousness (of) the belief. Let us call the former ('lower') part 'part V 
and the latter ('upper') part 'part 2/ and simply refer to the entire 
pre-reflective state as the 'whole.' Now the whole is surely identical with 
the whole, part 1 is surely still identical with part 1, and part 2 is still 
identical with part 2. The Law of Identity remains unthreatened. Of 
course, it is true that the whole is neither identical with part 1 nor with 
part 2, but that would not violate the Law of Identity. In a similar way, 
acknowledging that part 1 is not identical with part 2 does not violate 
the Law. On the WIV and on Sartre's view, we can see how confusion 
might arise. Nonetheless, conscious mental states are still identical with 
themselves. Clarifying the structure of conscious states as we have in the 
57 I cannot pursue this topic here, but see BN (especially Part Two, Chapter Two 
entitled Temporality') and BNC 43-57 & 150-4. 
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last two sections and in figure 3 helps us to see what Sartre apparently 
did not. Thus, Sartre is wrong when he replies that 'to affirm that the 
consciousness (of) belief [= part 2] is consciousness (of) belief is to 
dissociate consciousness from belief, to suppress the parenthesis, and to 
make belief an object for consciousness' (BN 121). But part 2 can clearly 
be identical with itself and we can also maintain that consciousness is not 
'dissociated' from the belief while keeping the parenthesis and not 
making belief a distinct object of consciousness.58 
V The BN 11 Argument 
In chapter four of BNC, Wider considers several alleged counterexam- 
ples to the general thesis that consciousness entails self-consciousness 
(hereafter, the CESC Thesis) and discusses how Sartre might reply.59 In 
that chapter, however, Wider also discusses what I consider to be Sartre's 
main argument for his belief that all consciousness is self-consciousness. 
As I have made clear throughout this paper, I agree with many of Sartre's 
conclusions about the structure of conscious states as well as being a 
defender of the CESC Thesis. However, this is not to say that I agree with 
all of his reasoning for that thesis, and his main argument for it is shaky 
at best. This often quoted passage goes as follows: 
the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge 
o/its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. That is a 
necessary condition, for if my consciousness were not consciousness of being 
consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of the table without 
consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be consciousness ignorant of 
itself, an unconscious - which is absurd. This is a sufficient condition, for my being 
conscious of being conscious of that table suffices in fact for me to be conscious of 
it. (BN 11) 
What is going on here? Well, the claim of sufficiency seems fine, but what 
about the claim of a necessary condition? That is, why exactly is such 
58 And, of course, the mere fact that mental states are directed 'outside of themselves' 
does not violate the Law either. To think so would be to confuse the mental state 
with the content of the mental state. 
59 They have to do with dreaming, people with blindsight, and Armstrong's well- 
known long-distance truck driver case. Obviously, I do not believe that such cases 
threaten the CESC Thesis, but I will not digress into a lengthy discussion of them 
here. It should be noted also that Wider defends Sartre and the Thesis to some extent 
later in BNC 164-169. She is right, however, that if Sartre completely rejected the 
unconscious, then it is much more difficult for him to handle the blindsight cases. 
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self-consciousness necessary for having a conscious mental state of, in 
this case, perceiving the table? Sartre uses a reductio ad absurdum; namely, 
that if there were no self-consciousness, then there would ultimately be 
'consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious - which is absurd/ The 
idea seems to be that an unconscious consciousness is clearly absurd. 
However, while saying that the same mental state is both conscious and 
unconscious would be absurd, Sartre's reductio does not really force us 
into that conclusion. The reason is that he is referring to two different 
mental states (or at least two parts of a complex mental state): (1) the 
first-order world-directed consciousness of the table, and (2) the self-con- 
sciousness (of) the first-order consciousness. Sartre needs to show that 
(1) cannot occur without (2) and his main argument does not really do 
so, since an unconscious (2) does not contradict having a conscious (1). 
At the least, much more argument is needed to establish that (1) cannot 
exist without (2). So Sartre's argument at best begs the question, and, as 
Wider puts it, the question remains: 'is a consciousness that is not 
self-consciousness absurd, a contradiction?' (BNC 104). I believe that 
Sartre is attempting to give some support for the HOT theorist's intuitive 
idea, mentioned early in section II, that when one is in a conscious mental 
state one is certainly aware that one is in it. (Recall also that the sense of 
'conscious state' at work is Nagel's sense, i.e. there is 'something it is like 
to be in that state' from a subjective or first-person point of view.) 
However, Sartre's BN 11 argument for the CESC thesis fails partly 
because he is not properly distinguishing between the lower-order and 
the meta-psychological state. Wider rightly points out (at BNC 104-5) 
that there are many other people who have argued for some version of 
the CESC thesis, including David Rosenthal and Roderick Chisholm, but 
then she is quick to mention many who disagree with it (including Fred 
Dretske). I do not wish to enter into this debate here, but Wider is right 
that it is incumbent on 'Sartre and others who hold such a view [to] offer 
a defense of this position' (BNC 105).60 
Returning to the Bll argument, I think that it fails also because Sartre 
is not clear about the distinction between what Rosenthal calls 'transi- 
tive' and 'intransitive' consciousness.61 Rosenthal explains that we some- 
times use the word 'conscious' as in our being 'conscious of something. 
This is the transitive use. On the other hand, we also apply the term 
'conscious' to mental states, and 'the lack of a direct object suggests 
60 Indeed, this is precisely what I have done at book length in CSC. 
61 Rosenthal, 'A Theory of Consciousness' 
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calling this the intransitive use/62 Using this distinction, Rosenthal char- 
acterizes the HOT theory as claiming that 'a mental state is intransitively 
conscious just in case we are transitively conscious of it/ So, for example, 
my perception of the table is (intransitively) conscious just in case I am 
(transitively) conscious of it. Rosenthal makes it clear that analyzing 
intransitive (i.e., state) consciousness in terms of transitive consciousness 
is not circular because transitive consciousness is not a type of intransi- 
tive consciousness. Sartre is led astray because he conflates the two and 
therefore claims that there is a contradiction where there is not. But even 
if we agree that the Bll passage fails as an argument for the CESC thesis, 
some of it can still be interestingly viewed as a (perhaps unclear) version 
of Rosenthal's statement of the thesis. In defense of Sartre, he might 
generously be interpreted as stating that intransitive consciousness en- 
tails transitive consciousness even if he has not shown that the opposing 
view is absurd or contradictory. 
But we must be careful here. Although Rosenthal addresses why his 
analysis is not circular, does the threat of an infinite regress reappear? 
As we saw in Section III.2, this is a concern of both Sartre and any HOT 
theorist. Although Rosenthal uses the term 'conscious of in speaking of 
transitive consciousness, he immediately notes that he is in that context 
using 'interchangeably the notions of being conscious of and being 
aware of/63 So the HOT is aware of [i.e. transitively conscious of] the 
lower-order state, but presumably such 'awareness' is not conscious in 
the Nagelean sense; otherwise there would be the infinite regress that 
Rosenthal is so careful to avoid in his earlier paper.64 This terminological 
matter is perhaps a bit misleading and confusing, and it is why I 
normally prefer to avoid the transitive/intransitive consciousness dis- 
tinction. Nonetheless, Sartre seems to be attempting something similar 
to Rosenthal; namely, analyzing intransitive consciousness in terms of 
transitive consciousness. Indeed, as we have seen through the numerous 
quotations above, Sartre frequently uses the transitive 'conscious of way 
of speaking throughout BN. Nonetheless, we must be careful not to 
interpret the transitive 'conscious of locution as implying anything 
more than some kind of nonconscious awareness.65 
62 Ibid., 26. The next quotation is also from 26. 
63 Ibid., n. 28 
64 Rosenthal, Two Concepts of Consciousness' 
65 For another criticism of the BN 11 passage, see Soil, 'Sartre's Rejection of the 
Freudian Unconscious,' 593-6. 
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VI I-thoughts and I-concepts 
Another contention of the HOT theorist is that the HOT (or MET) is of 
the form 'I am in mental state M now/ That is, the content of the HOT is 
an indexical thought making reference to both the person having the 
mental state (the T) and the mental state (the 'M'). However, it is crucial 
to recall that the HOT is not itself conscious when one is in a world-di- 
rected conscious state. The 'I-thought' is implicit in such cases and only 
becomes explicit on the reflective level. For example, my current con- 
scious desire to work on this paper contains the implicit (unconscious) 
thought that I am having that desire now. But when I reflect or introspect, 
I consciously and explicitly apprehend that desire as mine. The same is 
true when we have all sorts of other mental states, e.g. beliefs and various 
perceptual states. 
Sartre initially has difficulty with this aspect of the HOT theory while 
distinguishing between pre-reflective and reflective conscious states. In 
TE he first asks, 'is there room for an I in such [an unreflected] conscious- 
ness? The reply is clear: evidently not' (TE 41). But this is where, in TE, 
Sartre is concerned with rejecting Husserl's transcendental I. Thus I think 
that Sartre is merely saying that on the pre-reflective level there is no 
conscious apprehension of an I (i.e. no conscious HOT) because my 
conscious attention is focused outside of me, as the HOT theory also 
claims. So later Sartre explains that 'there is no I on the unreflected level. 
When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed 
in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is the consciousness of the 
streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of 
consciousness' (TE 48-9). Once again, the HOT theorist would say that 
there is no conscious I on the unreflected level, and I believe that is what 
Sartre meant in this passage. There is, however, a nonconscious or 
implicit I even on the unreflected level. Sartre says as much later in TE: 
'It is certain ... that the I does appear on the unreflected level' (TE 89). 
When I am preoccupied with outer reality (e.g. in trying to hang a picture 
or in running after a streetcar) I am still implicitly aware of myself (T) as 
being in a conscious mental state. In BN Sartre explains that the 'unre- 
flective consciousness is a consciousness o/the world. Therefore for the 
unreflective consciousness the self exists on the level of objects in the 
world.... Only the reflective consciousness has the self directly for an 
object' (BN 349, second emphasis added). So a first-order consciousness 
is directed at the world and a reflective consciousness is directed at 
oneself, but, even on the unreflective level, one still has indirect or implicit 
thoughts about oneself. 
Now it is clear that there are many kinds of so-called T-thoughts' 
ranging from very unsophisticated to very sophisticated. Such sophisti- 
cation, in part, results from the type of T-concept' contained within the 
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I-thought.66 So, for example, we might distinguish between the following 
I-concepts: 
1. I qua thinker among other thinkers. 
2. I qua enduring thinking being. 
3. I qua experiencer of a current mental state. 
4. I qua this thing as opposed to other physical things (where 'this 
thing' refers to one's body as distinct from other bodies). 
The above I-concepts are in decreasing order of sophistication. Think- 
ing of myself as a thinker among many other thinkers or as an enduring 
object through time requires conceptual abilities that go beyond simply 
distinguishing my body from other objects. Thus, the type 4 concept can 
presumably be possessed by various lower animals whereas the type 1 
concept may only be a human or higher mammal capacity.67 The point I 
wish to emphasize here with respect to Sartre is that, depending on the 
mental capacities of the organism, one can have either an unconscious or 
conscious HOT which contains any of the above I-concepts. Most rele- 
vant for my purposes is showing how this point relates to Wider's inter- 
pretation of Sartre as emphasizing what she calls 'bodily 
self-consciousness' (BNC 115). Inchapter fiveof BNC, Wider develops an 
interpretation of Sartre whereby 'the most basic form of self-conscious- 
ness mustbe bodily awareness' (BNC 115). lam largely inagreement with 
this view both as an interpretation of Sartre and as an independently 
plausible theory. Indeed, Wider cites numerous examples of philoso- 
phers and psychologists, such as Gareth Evans, Gerald Edelman, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who also seem to hold such a view in some form 
or another (BNC 127ff .and 139ff .). Wider states the principle claim as 'the 
body is the subject of consciousness' (BNC 115). Thus, an implicit!' refers 
to the body even when one has the most rudimentary conscious state on 
the unreflective level. It seems to me that Wider's view can be interpreted 
as endorsing the notion that the type 4 1-concept above is the least sophis- 
ticated and that it appears even on the unreflective level. Wider explains: 
all consciousness, even at the prereflective level, must be present to itself. Now if 
consciousness just is the body's presence to the world, as Sartre argues, then the 
66 Indeed, this is what I argue at greater length in CSC 78-84. 
67 See again CSC 78-84, but also CSC ch. 9. Actually, I argue that any conscious lower 
animal is at least capable of having both the type 2 and the type 3 1-concept. 
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body must be present to itself in being present to the world. So there must be a kind 
of consciousness of the body, what I will call bodily self-consciousness, and this 
must form part of our awareness of the world. The most basic form of self-conscious- 
ness must be bodily awareness. (BNC 115) 
So, in terms of the HOT theory, even when we have first-order world- 
directed conscious states, there is bodily self-consciousness; that is, a 
HOT (or MET) containing at least the most primitive (type 4) I-concept. 
Such an I-concept is thus part of the I-thought which, as I have argued 
in previous sections, is part of the complex conscious state itself. So, once 
again, all consciousness is self-consciousness. That such bodily self- 
awareness even exists on the unreflective level is indicated by Sartre's 
remark that 'the body belongs ... to the structures of the non-thetic [i.e. 
non-positional] self-consciousness' (BN 434). ^ 
Much of this is reminiscent of the Kantian idea that having experience 
of outer objects presupposes distinguishing them from oneself. Thus 
having I-thoughts is presupposed in objective experience. At the very 
least, in order to having conscious thoughts about external objects one 
must be able to differentiate them from oneself (including one's own 
body and one's own mental states). If one did not implicitly distinguish 
outer objects from oneself, then one would treat the enduring objects of 
experience as merely momentary fleeting subjective states which, in 
turn, would make objective experience impossible. Restricting ourselves 
to bodily self-awareness, then, Wider tells us in a Kantian spirit that 
'without bodily self-consciousness, consciousness of the world is impos- 
sible' (BNC 118). Citing such prominent philosophers as Daniel Dennett 
and Owen Flanagan, Wider explains that 'even on the most primitive 
levels of conscious life, simply to survive an organism must be able to 
distinguish its biological self from that which is not itself. There must be 
an ability to make a me/not-me distinction' (BNC 122-3). As I mentioned 
above, it would seem likely that even the lowest of conscious creatures 
are at least capable of having the type 4 I-concept. This would therefore 
support the idea that even the most primitive conscious creatures are 
self-conscious in at least this rudimentary way.69 
68 It occurs to me that the above four I-concepts correspond somewhat to Sartre's 
distinction between four types of self-consciousness (see BNC ch. 3) in the following 
way: (a) type 1 = being-for-others; (b) type 2 = impure reflection; (c) type 3 = pure 
reflection; and (d) type 4 = pre-reflective (or 'bodily') self-consciousness. 
69 For more on the connection between Kant and the HOT theory, see CSC chs. 3, 4 
and 9. For more on the connection between Sartre and Kant, see BNC 20-39 and TE 
31ff. 
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I must confess, however, that I do not see how any of the above or 
anything in Wider's book warrants her blanket rejection of identifying 
conscious mental states with neural activity. In a very puzzling passage, 
Wider says that many philosophers, such as John Searle and Colin 
McGinn, are guilty of ignoring the rest of the body when they speak of 
consciousness as a brain property. Wider says that 'it is the body, the 
organism as a whole, that is conscious' (BNC 114, emphasis added). It is 
not clear to me what this means other than what she says two sentences 
later: 'the body (not the brain) ...is the subject o/consciousness' (BNC 114, 
emphasis added). But even with our explication above of this latter 
claim, it clearly does not follow that the entire body is conscious. Rather, 
one has a kind of self-awareness which refers to one's own body (an 
'I-thought'). But the complex conscious mental state itself can still be 
identified with neural activity, though the HOT theorist is typically silent 
on this empirical question. 
Wider also seems to be confusing what Rosenthal calls 'creature 
consciousness' with 'state consciousness.'70 The former recognizes that 
we often speak of whole organisms as conscious, but the latter recognizes 
that we also speak of specific mental states as being conscious. Indeed, 
it is state consciousness that has been my primary concern throughout 
this paper and Sartre is also clearly first and foremost attempting to 
present a theory of state consciousness. Thus when one is concerned with 
examining what makes particular mental states conscious, a mind-brain 
identity theory can still arguably be the most plausible reductionist 
alternative while also remaining compatible with everything said earlier 
in this section. In short, conscious mental states can still be neural states 
while also referring to the body and having the structure defended 
throughout this paper. Bodily aware I-thoughts accompany every con- 
scious mental state, but it does not follow that the entire body is con- 
scious. My conscious visual perception of the tree contains implicit 
reference to my body, but the visual experience itself can still just be 
identical with a pattern of neural activity in my visual cortex. Indeed, it 
would not even seem to make sense to say that such a conscious mental 
state is my body. 
Perhaps even more puzzling is Wider's analogy that 'just as a jet 
engine needs wings and tail and other parts to generate flight in the 
aircraft, so too the brain needs kidneys and lungs and blood and air to 
generate consciousness' (BNC 114). If this is meant to support the iden- 
tity of the body and consciousness, then it also fails. First of all, in the 
70 Rosenthal, 'A Theory of Consciousness' 
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case of an airplane there is no analog to state consciousness; that is, we 
only speak of the entire airplane flying and never just of an engine flying. 
Second, Wider is confusing a necessary condition with an identity claim: 
it is one thing to say that A needs {B, C, ... X} in order to generate Z, but 
quite another to say that {A ... X} is Z. Once again, the latter does not 
follow from the former. It is still perfectly possible that only A (or a part 
of A) is conscious. Even Wider seems to concede this in her analogy by 
saying that the 'brain ... generate[s] consciousness' (albeit with the help 
of the necessary conditions she mentions, such as blood and air). Thus 
we must be careful not to take Sartre's theory as ruling out a mind-brain 
identity theory. 
VII Conclusion 
Although Sartre may not have always argued well for his conclusion that 
consciousness is self-consciousness and although he did often struggle 
with the details of his theory (such as with the unity problem), I hope I 
have shown that he had much of value to say about the structure of 
conscious mental states. For example, Sartre's theory is importantly 
related to the HOT theory of consciousness and he held a modified 
version of the theory. I have therefore shown how his views can be 
informatively placed against the background of a contemporary analytic 
approach to consciousness. Sartre also addressed several key issues 
frequently associated with the HOT theory, such as the threat of an 
infinite regress and the debate over the existence of nonconscious men- 
tality. Finally, as Kathleen Wider has helped us to understand, Sartre's 
theory also offers insights into the important relationship between hav- 
ing conscious mental states and the presence of so-called T-thoughts.'71 
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71 Thanks to Kathleen Wider and Yiwei Zheng for some helpful correspondence 
during my work on this paper. Thanks also to a referee for several helpful com- 
ments. 
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